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Abstract The article copes with the ongoing effort to es-
tablish implicit auctions to allocate transmission capacity
on cross-border interconnectors in the power grid. By the
means of implicit auctions (in contrast to explicit auctions),
cross-border capacities are included in the clearing of local
power exchanges. Concerning the day ahead auction, ‘mar-
ket coupling’ plays an important role. Market coupling con-
nects (formerly often national) electricity markets, simpli-
fying cross-border trade. One of the main drivers of mar-
ket coupling projects is the pursuit of European market inte-
gration i.e. allowing for convenient cross-border trade. The
other reason is the perception that explicit auctions of trans-
mission capacity (in addition to energy auctions which are
often performed later) do sometimes lead to sub-optimal re-
sults. The objective function of market coupling is the max-
imisation of total welfare of all connected markets. Fur-
ther to the explanation of different market coupling models
(also regarding capacity calculation), the current develop-
ment in Europe is wrapped up—including the CWE market
coupling (Central Western Europe) project. The CWE mar-
ket coupling is announced to start in fall 2010, coupling the
day-ahead electricity markets of Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
Market Coupling und das CWE-Projekt
Zusammenfassung Der vorliegende Artikel beschäftigt
sich mit aktuellen Bestrebungen zur impliziten Bewirtschaf-
tung von Grenzkuppelstellen im Stromnetz. Durch implizi-
te Auktionen (im Gegensatz zu expliziten Auktionen) wer-
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den Grenzkuppelkapazitäten automatisch im Rahmen der
Markträumung (Marktpreisbestimmung) lokaler Strombör-
sen berücksichtigt. Dabei spielt bezüglich der vortäglichen
Spotauktion („day ahead“) insbesondere das so genannte
Market Coupling eine bedeutende Rolle. Im Rahmen des
Market Coupling werden (vormals häufig) nationale Strom-
märkte so verbunden, dass der grenzüberschreitende Handel
vereinfacht wird. Der Grund hierfür ist einerseits der po-
litische Wunsch nach einer europäischen „Marktintegrati-
on“ als auch die Beobachtung, dass explizite Auktionen von
Übertragungskapazität (zusätzlich zu zeitlich häufig anders
gelagerten Spotauktionen für Energie) tendenziell zu subop-
timalen Allokationen führen. Zielfunktion der Grenzkuppel-
stellenbewirtschaftung ist im Rahmen des Market Coupling
die Maximierung der Wohlfahrt aller derart verbundenen
Märkte. Im Rahmen des Artikels werden grundsätzliche Ar-
ten des Market Coupling – auch bezüglich der Kapazitäts-
berechnung – erläutert sowie ein kurzer Überblick über die
derzeitig in Europa umgesetzten Coupling-Projekte gege-
ben. Dabei wird auch auf das CWE-Market-Coupling (Cen-
tral Western Europe) eingegangen, das im Herbst 2010 zwi-
schen Belgien, Deutschland, Frankreich, Luxemburg und
den Niederlanden starten soll.
1 Introduction
The European electricity market is subject to integration ef-
forts with the long term aim of building a single electric-
ity market (alternatively: internal electricity market—IEM).
Today’s integration efforts are especially focusing on con-
gestion management at cross border interconnections: these
are the power lines connecting (most often national) elec-
tricity market areas. Historically, these electricity market ar-
eas relate to one or multiple TSO-areas, therefore the term
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‘cross border’ interconnections is often used to denominate
congested lines between price resp. market areas. Since EC
Regulation 1228/2003 on “network access for cross border
exchanges” stipulated the use of “non-discriminatory mar-
ket based solutions”, which “should give economic signals
to the market participants and transmission system opera-
tors involved” there have been ongoing efforts to address
the problem of scarce cross border capacities. This led to
a steady development of congestion management methods.
Nowadays, the large majority of interconnector capacity in
Europe is allocated on a yearly, monthly and day-ahead ba-
sis. The day-ahead allocation is often conducted via explicit
auctions. The gate-closure times of these auctions are usu-
ally some hours before the gate-closure times of the orga-
nized day ahead markets. In general, explicit auctions fulfil
the requirement of EC 1228/2003. Considering the results
of the organized day-ahead power exchange markets, some-
times flows from a high price area to a low price area can
be observed. Those are called ‘adverse flows’. Such adverse
flows can be interpreted the way that the parties involved
were not able to predict prices in the connected regions prop-
erly (otherwise they would not have paid for capacity just to
loose money).
This is for example demonstrated by Dieckmann (2008)
who ran a least square regression analysis against historical
power price spreads and auction results for transmission ca-
pacity on the border between the Netherlands and Germany.
Her OLS linear regression analysis on an hourly basis for the
year 2007 yields an impressively weak relation of roughly
0.08 between power price spreads and prices for transmis-
sion capacity.
Another example of inefficiencies under explicit auctions
is given by Böttcher (2008) who gives an estimate of ob-
served adverse flows to be in the range of 20% to 30% on in-
terconnectors at the Danish-German border when auctioned
explicitly.
An adequate measure to improve this capacity allocation
mechanism is to introduce implicit auctions where capac-
ity is allocated implicitly within the clearing of the energy
markets and market participants do not have to cope with
price predictions for arbitrage between market areas. Ra-
tionales, mechanisms and organisation of implicit auction
mechanisms for the allocation of scarce interconnector ca-
pacities are exhibited in the next chapter.
An overview of abbreviations that are often used in the
context of market coupling is given in a concluding table at
the end of the article (Table 1).
2 Basics and Applications of Market Coupling
Let’s start with an example: be A and B two interconnected
electricity market areas with accordingly different sup-
ply/demand curves and therefore different prices (Fig. 1a).
Fig. 1 Supply and demand curves in isolated and connected electricity
markets (Source: EnBW Transportnetze AG)
Until now, the interconnector is not used since both markets
are in their local equilibrium. However, such a situation of-
fers an arbitrage opportunity, namely to buy electricity in
Region B (where the price S∗B is lower than the price S∗A in
region A) and sell it to region A. Under perfect competition,
this would happen until prices in regions A and B are equal
or interconnector capacity is exhausted. The prices for the
case where the interconnector is used are denoted as S˜∗A,B.
Figure 1b shows the case where interconnector capacity is
used and where it is not scarce: then, prices in both regions
are equal (S˜∗A = S˜∗B). If the interconnector capacity available
is not sufficient to equalize prices in both regions, a price dif-
Z Energiewirtsch (2010) 34: 303–309 305
ference will remain: S˜∗A = S˜∗B (see Fig. 1c). This price dif-
ference (multiplied with the transfer capacity) is then called
‘congestion rent’ (cf. Stoft 2002). It is the economic value of
the interconnector for this specific hour when it is a scarce
resource.
As discussed before, leaving the task of allocating in-
terconnector capacity to the market (in the sense of using
at least 3 different auctions, at least one for capacity and
two for day-ahead markets, each with different gate-closure
times and therefore inconsistent expectations), does often
not lead to optimal (or even ‘good’) allocation decisions.
The reason for this is uncertainty in expectations: electric
power prices are very volatile in nature and thus is the spread
between two power prices an arbitrager would have to esti-
mate in order to express his valuation for cross border ca-
pacity between those market areas. As already mentioned,
capacity auctions are usually done some hours before clos-
ing of the electricity market auctions. This increases the un-
certainty the trader has when valuing transmission capacity
(which he has to do before submitting his bid).
To improve this mechanism, implicit auctions can be
used—meaning that cross-border capacity is allocated im-
plicitly within the auctioning of energy in the interconnected
electricity markets. Therefore trading electricity becomes
less complex, the aforementioned inefficiencies are avoided
and scarce interconnector capacity is used more economi-
cally. The main terms used to describe the implementation
of implicit auctions are ‘market splitting’ and ‘market cou-
pling’. The definitions for the two approaches found in the
literature (cf. ETSO 2001a; Grimm et al. 2008; Dieckmann
2008) vary, but market splitting is used to describe a mar-
ket operated by a single power exchange, whereas market
coupling refers rather to a co-operation of multiple power
exchanges.
Under both set-ups, the market participants simply place
their bids on the respective market, if necessary including
a related area. The clearing of the market(s) is then done
considering transmission capacity and local bids simultane-
ously, leading to an optimal allocation.
2.1 Capacity Calculation
In a bilateral environment, the market coupling sketched in
Fig. 1 is—theoretically—easy to implement. However, to-
day’s power grids are highly meshed and coupling projects
do often incorporate more than two areas. This is exhibited
in Fig. 2: The physical result of withdrawing 100 MW in
Region A intending to deliver it in Region B may lead to
physical flows totally different from what could have been
intuitively expected.
This leads to the insight, that cross-border capacity has
to be carefully assessed, it is therefore not possible to offer
the full physical capacity of the line to the market. Not only
Fig. 2 In highly meshed grids, a commercial flow of 100 MW from
Region A to B might lead to a totally counter-intuitive physical result
(Source: EnBW Transportnetze AG)
would possible loop flows be neglected, operational secu-
rity would also be put at stake since some physical capacity
is always needed to safely cope with contingencies. The as-
sessment of the capacities which can safely be offered to the
market is commonly done by load-flow calculations which
assume a “base case” scenario (of plant dispatch and con-
sumption). Then, production is shifted from one region to
another to examine whether operational security can still be
guaranteed in that case. The maximum value not affecting
static system security is then reduced by a reliability mar-
gin to cope with loop flows and contingencies. The result is
the NTC (net transfer capacity) and represents the maximum
capacity that can be offered to the market. Considering that
interconnector capacity is often allocated in different auc-
tions (usual scheme: yearly, monthly and daily auctions), the
available transfer capacity ATC is calculated by subtracting
the already allocated capacity (AAC):
ATC = NTC − AAC.
This calculation scheme (ETSO 2001b) can be considered
as current standard. However, many cross border capacities
are nowadays assessed bilaterally, using profiles including
multiple borders (e.g. ‘German C’, ‘Swiss Roof’, ‘Italian
Roof’; cf. EnBW 2009 and Duthaler 2007).
A different capacity calculation method than the ATC-
approach is the so-called flow-based method. It incorporates
the use of power transmission distribution factors (PTDFs)
which reflect the changes in physical flows induced by pro-
duction shifts between regions. For example, the flows in
Fig. 2, induced by a production increase of 100 MW in Re-
gion A and a corresponding decrease of 100 MW in Region
B would have been properly predicted by the use of PTDFs.
Yet, flow-based scenarios are very complex and their ability
to improve overall welfare heavily depends on the quality
of grid models used. For further discussion, see Dieckmann
(2008), Duthaler (2007).
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2.2 Market Coupling as an Optimisation Problem
Market Coupling can be formulated as an optimisation prob-
lem. The objective is then to maximise overall welfare. Wel-
fare is defined as the cumulated differences between the
willingness to pay and the accepted prices asked as revealed
during the bidding process. Following Meeus et al. (2009),
the problem (without considering that commercial flows can





















Er,rex = 0 ∀r ∈ R,
Er,rex ≤ Capr,rex ∀r, rex,
qi ≤ Qi ∀i,
qj ≤ Qj ∀j,
where r ∈ R are the regions considered, i ∈ Ir the demand
bids in Region r , j ∈ Jr the supply bids in Region r and
Pi,j ,Qi,j the related prices and quantities. The quantities
accepted are denominated by qi,j . The maximum transfer
capacity between two Regions r, rex is given by Capr,rex ,
the actually used capacity is given by Er,rex . The solution
of this optimisation problem yields an optimal usage of the
interconnector capacities. Prices can then be computed by
considering the prices of the last bids (e.g. highest for sup-
ply bids, lowest for demand) accepted in each region. How-
ever, the formulation given above is a strong simplifica-
tion: block-orders (i.e. bids covering multiple hours) which
are widely used among European power exchanges are ne-
glected. Because those bids cannot be partly accepted, the
given linear problem becomes a mixed integer linear prob-
lem which is NP-hard and poses a computational challenge,
especially if the coupling algorithm is subject to real-time
constraints. Real-time constraints means: The system must
deliver a result before a given deadline. In market coupling
applications, this is due to subsequent processes following
the clearing of the markets such as validation of schedules
by the transmission system operators (TSOs) involved.
2.3 Practical Aspects of Market Coupling
As already touched on in the explanation of market coupling
and market splitting, organizational aspects of market cou-
pling solutions play an important role: As European power
markets cannot be designed ‘from the scratch’, market inte-
gration efforts have to build on the existing structure. There-
fore, different market coupling models exist. The most inte-
grated one is “price market coupling” (or “price coupling”).
In a price coupling approach, both prices and flows are
computed centrally by the coupling algorithm. This means
that the power exchanges of the regions involved do not set
prices but just forward bids to the coupler and receive prices
(and volumes) in return. If price calculation shall remain a
power exchange task, volume coupling is an option. In vol-
ume coupling, only flows are calculated based on the bids
received from the exchanges. The difference between price
and volume coupling is thus whether the price calculation is
done centrally (price coupling) or decentrally (volume cou-
pling). In the latter case, price calculation can be kept at the
power exchanges. The power exchanges then receive unlim-
ited bids calculated by the volume coupler. Depending on
how exact the volume coupler simulates the clearing pro-
cess of the involved power exchanges, the volume coupling
is called ‘loose’ or ‘tight’ (EuroPEX, ETSO 2009).
The situations that are more likely to occur with loose
coupling than with tight coupling are not necessarily adverse
flows, but such that the transmission capacity may not be
fully utilised even though the local power exchange prices
are different.
However, the exclusive use of capacity by a central cou-
pling algorithm makes this algorithm a monopoly function
with respect to the allocation of cross-border capacity. This
is true for both volume and price coupling. Thus with market
coupling, the access to interconnector capacity is discrimi-
natory in the sense that it is offered exclusively to the cou-
pled power exchanges. This is in contrast to EC 1228 (2003)
which requires a “non-discriminatory” access to capacity.
Therefore, to keep the market for power exchanges
contestable, new entry to the coupling mechanism should
be kept possible. Otherwise, this would pave the way to
‘cartelize the supply of trading services and to monopolize
the operation of trade across borders’ (Meeus 2010). This
implies that the operation of the central coupling mecha-
nism would require some kind of regulatory control in order
to keep the ‘supply of trading services’ (i.e. the power ex-
changes’ business) contestable.
Besides that, difficulties arise because of parallel cou-
pling initiatives starting to overlap: two regions operating
their own coupling algorithm can in general not be “con-
nected” (cf. E-Bridge 2009). Often, different approaches
were used to implement the respective coupling solutions
which makes them incompatible (both technical and gover-
nance issues). In such cases, ‘disassembling’ the established
processes and building a new, central solution often seems
difficult and costly. A possible solution is the installation of a
so-called “dome” coupler (Fig. 3). A dome coupler receives
the aggregated bids of all involved market areas. Those mar-
ket areas are already coupled by separate regional market
coupling systems. Then, the dome coupler calculates unlim-
ited bids between the areas which are physically intercon-
nected, but whose interconnectors are not covered by the
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Fig. 3 Dome coupling is a volume coupler coupling multiple, already
existing coupling systems (Source: EnBW Transportnetze AG)
regional market coupling systems. This requires the dome
coupler to mimick the already installed coupling systems
as exact as possibly, since only then the calculated bids of
the dome coupler can sufficiently contribute to overall wel-
fare maximisation. (EuroPEX, ETSO 2009). Since the dome
coupler only generates (unlimited) bids and leaves price de-
termination to the regional/local entities, dome coupling is
necessarily volume coupling.
The issues discussed above underline the need for a coor-
dinated institutional and legal framework. A short summary
of the discussions and results between the European Com-
mission, regulators and TSOs is given in the next chapter.
3 Current Development and Perspectives in Europe
and CWE MC
The official, long-term target model is a single, day-ahead
price coupling all over Europe. To speed up this develop-
ment, the so-called ‘electricity regional initiative’ (ERI) was
set up in spring 2006 by the ERGEG (European Regula-
tor’s Group for Electricity and Gas). The rationale behind
this was to establish integrated regional markets as a starting
point for building the IEM. These regional initiatives are:
• Baltic (Baltic States—BS): Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
• Central East (CEE): Austria, Czech Republic, Germany,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
• Central South (CSE): Austria, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Slovenia
• Central-West (CWE): Belgium, France, Germany, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands
• Northern: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Poland,
Sweden
• South-West (SWE): France, Portugal, Spain
• France, UK, Ireland (FUI): The electricity market of Ire-
land is denoted as single electricity market (SEM) since
it encompasses the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ire-
land.
Currently, 4 cross-country-border coupling projects are at
operation in Europe. Those are:
• A market splitting solution in Portugal and Spain (Mer-
cado Ibérico de Electricidade—MIBEL),
• A market splitting solution for Denmark, Finland, Swe-
den, Norway, operated by Nordpoolspot,
• A price market coupling solution for the Netherlands,
Belgium and France (TLC—tri-lateral coupling) operated
by the power exchanges of the three countries,
• Volume market coupling between Germany and Denmark
+ Sweden, operated by EMCC.
An outline, how the long-term target could be reached
was given by the PCG1 at the 17th Florence Forum in De-
cember 2009 (Fig. 4). The abbreviations used in the figure
are the same as given above. The figure shows a possible
schedule for coupling electricity markets of the EU. Both
the average yearly consumption of the markets and the in-
terconnector capacities illustrate the coupling potential re-
sulting in a single coupled market of >3500 TWh yearly
consumption.
The PCG was then superseded by the AHAG, the ad-
hoc advisory group, which was set up by the 17th Florence
Forum. The tasks of AHAG are to support ERGEG in the
development of so-called framework guidelines (FG) stipu-
lated by the 3rd legislative package on EU electricity & gas
markets. The third package focuses on the integration of the
IEM and therefore cross-border issues. The implementation
of the third package shall be implemented by the following
interaction of regulators and concerned network operators:
the regulators will collaborate within ACER (Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators, EC 713/2009)—the cor-
responding organisation for the electricity TSOs is ENTSO-
E (European Network of Transmission System Operators for
Electricity, EC 714/2009). For implementation, ACER will
prepare specific framework guidelines which ENTSO-E will
then use to define Network Codes (NC). These Network
codes will then be approved by ACER, likely followed by
public consultations. The planned structure and schedule on
FGs and NCs is documented in the 3-year-Plan (“3a-Plan”)
by the High Level Group (composed of EC, both ENTSOs
and ERGEG) which was presented at the 18th Florence Fo-
rum. The timeframe envisaged by the plan are the years
2010–2012. Among the FGs which are all related to cross-
border topics, the FG “on capacity allocation and conges-
tion management” seems to have the most impact on market
1PCG stands for ‘Project Coordination Group’ which was estab-
lished in the aftermath of the 15th Florence Forum, held in Novem-
ber 2008. It was chaired by the European Regulators’ Group
for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) and included participants from
various stakeholders, including European power exchanges and
TSOs. Its job was to propose a target model to integrate the re-
gional European electricity markets. For further information, please
see: http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/
EER_WORKSHOP/Stakeholder%20Fora/Florence%20Fora/PCG.
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Fig. 4 Possible evolution of market coupling in Europe. Source: PCG
coupling activities and are also approached very early com-
pared to other activities of the 3a-Plan. Other FGs cover grid
connection, balancing, third party access etc. The aforemen-
tioned FG foresees 4 NCs:
1. Capacity Calculation,
2. ID platform (trading + congestion management),
3. DA (trading + congestion management) and
4. Forward markets.
This FG shall benefit directly from AHAG work which
has project groups on capacity calculation, intraday trad-
ing and day-ahead market coupling governance. The over-
all package implementation process then hopefully leads to
a harmonized European framework for market integration
projects: A standard set-up of common technical and gover-
nance rules which have been shown to be difficult and time-
consuming to create within single projects.
3.1 The CWE MC Project
The next coupling project launch foreseen is CWE/Nordic
(see press release by CWE members of 7 April 2010 and
common press release by CWE, EMCC and Nordic par-
ties of 29 July 2010). It is planned to start with ATC-
based price coupling between CWE members combined
with an ‘interim tight volume coupling’ (ITVC) to include
the Nordic region. The project will introduce a day ahead
price coupling for Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands. Three power exchanges (APX, Belpex
and EPEXSpot) and 6 transmission system operators are in-
volved in the project (Amprion, Creos, Elia, EnBW TNG,
RTE and TenneT). In course of the coupling, the gate-
closure times of all concerned day-ahead markets of the
power exchanges involved will be moved to 12.00 h.
The interim tight volume coupling will be provided by
EMCC who today already operate the volume coupling so-
lution between the Nordic region and Germany. The daily
coupling process will then have the following sequence:
1. simultaneous gate-closure of all power exchanges.
2. Calculation of bids (volume coupling) by EMCC, con-
sidering the behaviour of the CWE coupling algorithm.
3. Calculation of the CWE price coupling solution, submis-
sion of results to coupled power exchanges.
For the CWE price coupling, it is planned to test flow-based
coupling in parallel to the ATC operation and to analyse the
results. The project members will then jointly decide on a
switch to flow-based (Chouteau and Bourdon 2010).
In parallel to the ongoing CWE/Nordic process, an
ENTSO-E project on the NWE (=CWE/Nordic) “Endur-
ing Solution” has already been set up. This project aims at
developing an enduring price coupling solution for the NWE
region.
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Table 1 Market-coupling related terms
Abbreviation Explanation
ATC Available Transfer Capacity
DAM Day-Ahead Market
GCT Gate Closure Time
IEM Internal Electricity Market
PTDF Power Transfer Distribution Factor, approach to
implement flow-based market coupling
PX Power Exchange
TSO Transmission System Operator
4 Challenges and Conclusion
Although the basic idea of market coupling is simple, the
devil is in the details: coupling does not only require the
harmonization of gate-closure times of the power exchanges
involved, it also leads to widespread regulatory, legal and
technical questions. This is even more true, the more stake-
holders are exposed to the coupling. Therefore, coordina-
tion and political issues become more and more important
besides the technical challenges. However, market coupling
approaches can be considered as appropriate means towards
the IEM and the current projects are promising. Besides the
general coordination issues mentioned above, a severe con-
cern is with the changes implied by the introduction of cen-
tral algorithms, which allow for a potential of forming mar-
ket power. Therefore, the institutional arrangement of a cen-
tral coupling algorithm and the trading platforms (power ex-
changes) is crucial.
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